The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine

Summary, part 2

Chapter 1

The First Declaration of War, 1917-1939

At the turn of the 20th century, before Zionist colonization, Palestine was an expanding society integrating into the global capitalist order. A commercial bourgeoisie and an urban working class were forming, and a sense of identity was evolving from a strong loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty to a weakened one, which was accelerated by greater socioeconomic mobility and access to education. 

During this time, “a large proportion of the Jews living in Palestine were still culturally quite similar to and lived reasonably comfortably alongside city-dwelling Muslims and Christians” (p. 19). 

The more rapid transformation of Western Europe and North America made it look like Middle Eastern societies like Palestine were “in decline” when they were not, (p. 20). Other events that impacted the growth of Palestine up until this point include the Libyan War (1911-12), the Balkan Wars (1912-13), and the first years of the First World War — all of which caused mass hardship across all classes, especially amongst the working class, and caused people to rethink their sense of identity. 

Khalidi marks a turning point in this period in 1917 when the Balfour Declaration was made by Arthur James Balfour — Britain’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Declaration was just a single sentence:

“His Majesty’s government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country” (p. 24).

This Declaration did several things, including:

• Formally allied Britain with Theodor Herzl and the Zionist movement

• Overlooked the overwhelmingly Arab population, which went largely unmentioned.

• Promised only civil and religious rights as opposed to political or national rights to current inhabitants. 

Khalidi argues that Britain was “never motivated by altruism” but instead by geopolitical reasons, with Palestine being a strategic location for them to control (p. 25). He also notes that whenever statesmen like Balfour referred to a “Jewish national home,” they “always meant an eventual Jewish state” (p. 25).

The Palestinian reaction to the Balfour Declaration was slow at first but later marked by a letter dispatched to the British Foreign Office stressing that “this country is our country” (p. 26). 

Prior to the Declaration, between 1909-14, 40,000 Jewish immigrants arrived, and 18 new colonies were created by the Zionist movement, leading to Palestinians being “deprived of their land as a result of the land sales” (p. 27). The Balfour Declaration only exacerbated these issues.

In the wake of the Balfour Declaration, Palestinian identity underwent a transformative process, though the precise nature of this evolution is challenging to ascertain due to limited oral historical accounts. Politically, Palestinians began to coalesce, forming seven Palestine Arab congresses that vehemently rejected the Balfour Declaration, advocated for majority rule, and sought to curb unlimited Jewish immigration and land acquisition. Yet, these pleas for recognition and justice fell on deaf ears as Britain's allyship with the burgeoning Zionist movement continued to undermine Palestinian aspirations. Although Palestinians felt tied to Arabism and the larger Arab world, a more specific Palestinian identity was constantly being reinforced because of Britain’s actions in support of Zionism.

In 1922, the newly established League of Nations issued a Mandate for Palestine, or the British Mandate, which formalized Britain’s governance over the region. The Mandate, which included 28 articles, was basically verbatim of the Balfour Declaration. Nowhere in the Mandate was there a mention of Palestinians as a people with national or political rights, nor was there any mention of representation for the Arab majority. This overlooking of Palestinians is perhaps unsurprising now that we know of a confidential 1919 memo not publicly made available until decades later, where Balfour wrote about Palestinians and said this:

“For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country … Whatever be the future of Palestine it is not now an ‘independent nation,’ nor is it yet on the way to become one” p. 38

Under British rule, Palestinians were treated similarly to how other British subjects like Hong Kong and Jamaica were treated: they were excluded from government posts, banned from political activity, subjected to censorship of the press, and more. However, Palestine was unique in the sense that the Mandate brought in many Jewish settlers “whose mission it was to take over the country” (p. 39). Also, under British rule, the Jewish population tripled from about 6% after WWI to about 18% in 1926. Khalidi notes that Jews fleeing Germany had nowhere else to go because the United States, the United Kingdom, and others had discriminatory immigration laws.

In the Mandate, there were “periodic outbreaks of violence” (p. 41) in the form of Palestinian resistance. Initially, a Pan-Islamic conference coordinated protests but was unwilling to confront the British head-on until a grassroots uprising and a six-month general strike occurred. This uprising developed into the great 1936-39 revolt. British tactics of divide and rule, however, were fairly successful in subduing these efforts. That said, this moment did lead to the creation of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), which was set up to lead the Arab majority, though the British never recognized this as legitimate.

Khalidi goes on to outline the kinds of violence Palestinians would face at the hands of the British. Shaykh Farhan al-Sa’di, an 81-year-old rebel leader, was put to death for possession of a single bullet. The British would tie Palestinian prisoners to the front of armored cars to prevent rebel attack. They would deport the entirety of the Palestinian national leadership.

During this time, Khalidi notes that Palestinians were beginning to divide based on whether they preferred to ally themselves with Amir ‘Abdullah of Jordan or if they preferred no form of compromise with the British.

After the 1936-39 revolt, the British wanted to improve its image and defuse the fury in Arab countries. Under British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s government, Britain issued a White Paper outlining the commitments it would take to curtail the Zionist movement (e.g. the limitation of immigration), but this was never fully implemented, as “the Zionist movement was to have effective veto power” (p. 48).

Next, Khalidi goes on to make several observations, including how his uncle Yusuf Diya believed the primary problem for Palestinians was the British. He shares the beliefs of other Palestinian figures, such as ‘Isa al-’Isa, who wrote in his memoirs he didn’t have a love for the British, but that the central problem was Zionism compounded by Palestinian and Arab weakness. 

But al-‘Isa had underestimated Palestinian strength. In 1919, United States President Woodrow Wilson’s King-Crane Commission thought it would take 50,000 soldiers to take Palestine, but it took more than double through 1936-39. Ultimately, Zionist movement had several advantages in the form of “massive capital investments, arduous labor, sophisticated legal maneuvers, intensive lobbying, effective propaganda, and covert and overt military means” (p. 53).