The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine

Summary, part 3

Chapter 2

The Second Declaration of War, 1947-1948

Khalidi begins the second chapter by recounting a story his father, Ismail Khalidi, told him before he passed away. Ismail’s brother, who was older by 20 years, was Dr. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi – former mayor of Jerusalem, a prominent party leader, and later Prime Minister of Jordan. Khalidi’s father met with King ‘Abdullah of Transjordan to speak on matters of Jordanian protections for Palestinians, of which he, the Arab Higher Committee, and Dr. Husayn politely declined due to the Kingdom’s pervasive British influence. This meeting was on the same day the United Nations General Assembly signed Resolution 181, which established partition on November 29, 1947.

This marked the start of what is now known as the Nakba, or the Catastrophe. 80% of the Arab population in Palestine were forced from their homes during this period. 720,000 of the 1.3 million Palestinians were made refugees. The new state of Israel now controlled 78% of the territory. 

Leading up to this, the end of World War II had brought on a new phase of colonial assault on Palestine, with the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics coming in as players. A dominant political figure, David Ben-Gurion, saw this coming. This is because, in 1942, a proclamation was made at the Biltmore Conference in New York that Palestine was to be established as a Jewish state. From here, Zionism “became part and parcel of the emerging American hegemony in the Middle East” (p. 60). The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946, for example, came to conclusions that mirrored Zionism, establishing the United States as the “predominant external actor” in the Middle East (p. 62).

Palestinians made efforts to develop effective tools for self-governance. In the years preceding the Nakba, the AHC founded the Arab National Fund, run by a man named Yusif Sayigh, which raised 176,00 Palestinian pounds. This was a fraction of the millions the Zionist movement had raised. Additionally, the Arab Office was established and run by a group of “highly motivated” men (p. 64). The Arab Office promised to fill in for the lack of diplomatic services available to Palestinians but ultimately failed to remedy the differences held within the community. 

Returning back to the discussion of UNGA Resolution 181 in November of 1947, Khalidi describes it as “another declaration of war” that came in two phases (p. 71). Phase one of the 1948 war culminated in a Zionist offensive dubbed Plan Dalet, which occurred in the spring of 1948. This offensive led to the mass expulsion of Palestinians from their homes, which unraveled like a “slow, seemingly endless train wreck” (p. 72). In April and the first half of May, Plan Dalet “involved the conquest and depopulation” of the two largest Arab centers — Jaffa and Haifa — meaning “the ethnic cleansing of Palestine began well before the state of Israel was proclaimed on May 15, 1948” (p. 72). People fled villages as news of massacres spread. There was a “pattern of ethnic cleansing [that] resulted in the expulsion and panicked departure of about 300,000 Palestinians” (p. 74-75).

After Israel was established on May 15, 1948, 400,000 Palestinians were expelled from their homes and escaped to neighboring Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza. Among those displaced were Khalidi’s grandparents. He notes that “the ruins of my grandparents’ large stone house still stand abandoned on the outskirts of Tel Aviv” (p. 75). 

Upon the creation of Israel, there was a “widely accepted assertion that the Israeli army was dwarfed by seven invading Arab armies,” but this assertion was being challenged since the Israeli military had been trained and commanded by Britain (p. 77). Arab states, which had fought alongside Palestinians against the 1948 war, now had to deal with their “powerful and aggressive” new neighbors on top of their domestic issues (p. 78). 

The 1948 war also confirmed that the US and USSR were eclipsing Britain’s role in the Middle East. Once Israel was established, both powers recognized the new country and offered military support, and neither did anything to facilitate the creation of an Arab state. The reasoning behind the support of the US and the USSR differed. The USSR assumed Israel could be a socialist protege, serving as a progressive counterweight to what they saw as Britain’s pawns in the Middle East. Israel, however, chose neutrality in the Korean War, moving it closer to the US. Additionally, the US was seen as a refuge for Jews fleeing Europe, so it was developing quite a sizeable Jewish population itself. This influx of Jews brought along with it modern political Zionism, which developed deep roots in the US amongst both Jews and Christians. The horrors of the Holocaust fueled even more support for the Zionist movement. Initially, many US officials were skeptical about the utility of having Israel as an ally but were eventually won over by Israel’s military victories and the potential the US saw for the oil industry in the region. Israel would not start receiving massive levels of US military and economic support until the 1970s.

As this was all unfolding after the Nakba, Palestinians were struggling on many fronts. More than one million faced “profound social disruption” with their homes, livelihoods, communities, properties, and capital lost (p. 81). Khalidi notes that “for all Palestinians … the Nakba formed an enduring touchstone of identity” (p. 84).

The 160,000 Palestinians who were not expelled from their homes were now citizens of Israel, where they lived under martial law, had their land seized, and were isolated by travel restrictions. They were essentially treated as second-class citizens. 

Those who fled to Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan put a lot of pressure on those countries’ relief capacity. 

• 5.5. million refugees and descendants are registered with UNRWA, but most of them, about four million, don’t live in refugee camps. 

• King ‘Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated for his dealings with Israel, which drove tensions between the Jordanian regime and Palestinians who were now the majority of Jordan’s population. These tensions lasted decades and exploded into armed conflict in 1970. 

• In Lebanon, Palestinians, who had a smaller proportion of the population, became involved in politics. Some Lebanese leaders were sympathetic to their cause, but Palestinians were never integrated into society and many clung to the hope of returning to their homeland, which furthered tensions between Palestinians and the Lebanese.

• The influx of Palestinians did not destabilize Syria, which was a more homogenous country. Palestinians received the benefits of Syrian citizenship (e.g. owning land) but were denied nationality, passports, and voting rights.

• Arab Gulf countries like Libya and Algeria were growing their oil economies. Many Palestinians went there and helped build up the industries, government, and education systems, but they were not granted citizenship or permanent residency.

Overall, Arab states “felt great and continuing concern about the question of Palestine, both out of broad sympathy for the people and because of the humiliating defeat of 1948” (p. 87). Khalidi writes that Arab countries would talk about Palestine because of domestic pressure, but ultimately not do anything about it out of fear of Israel’s might and the disapproval of the great powers. The question of Palestine was henceforth dubbed the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Palestinian endeavors to establish governance structures encountered significant challenges. Despite efforts by the AHC to create the Government of All Palestine in Gaza, its legitimacy was not recognized by neighboring Arab states, particularly Jordan, who did not want Palestine to have independent representation. The shattered remnants of Palestinian civil society, including trade unions and other non-elite groupings, in the aftermath of the Nakba, left few avenues for effective political organization. Notably, the Palestinian Communist Party, with its predominantly Arab membership but Jewish leadership, stood as a rare exception, eventually evolving into the core of the Israeli Communist Party.

One significant escalation of violence was marked by the Suez War of October 1956, which was Israel’s large-scale military operations against Egypt and police posts in Gaza. To fight back, Egypt wanted to purchase weapons from the US and Britain but were not permitted to, leading them to buy them from Czechoslovakia and exacerbating international tensions. In this crisis, the Egyptian military was ordered to help the Palestinians they were previously repressing. Israel began a full-scale invasion of Egypt in October 1956, and Egypt was “decisively and rapidly defeated,” having lost the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip (p. 93). During this time, Israeli troops swept through the camps of Khan Yunis and Rafah in November of 1956, killing and executing more than 450 people. Israel said these people were killed as a result of clashes between Israelis and Palestinians, but an UNRWA report found that “civilians were killed after all resistance had ceased in the Gaza Strip” (p. 94). Israel eventually withdrew from the formerly Egyptian-controlled territories in early October 1957. 

Amidst this turbulent backdrop, militant activities targeting Israel began to emerge, culminating in the formation of Fatah in 1959. In response to the escalating Palestinian struggle, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed in 1964, though it was largely controlled by Arab States. 

There eventually was a campaign of Palestinian-led sporadic but lethal attacks on Israel despite heavy-handed repression by Egypt. Israel’s retaliation to these attacks, however, was “massive and disproportionate, and saw Gaza bearing the brunt of these attacks (p. 91).

Khalidi ends by arguing that the Nakba shocked and humiliated Palestinians in such a way that it gave way to a desire to resist the powers repressing them, leading to a series of lethal armed raids that triggered disproportionate Israeli attacks in retaliation.

Those who fled to Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan put a lot of pressure on those countries’ relief capacity. 

• 5.5. million refugees and descendants are registered with UNRWA, but most of them, about four million, don’t live in refugee camps. 

• King ‘Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated for his dealings with Israel, which drove tensions between the Jordanian regime and Palestinians who were now the majority of Jordan’s population. These tensions lasted decades and exploded into armed conflict in 1970. 

• In Lebanon, Palestinians, who had a smaller proportion of the population, became involved in politics. Some Lebanese leaders were sympathetic to their cause, but Palestinians were never integrated into society and many clung to the hope of returning to their homeland, which furthered tensions between Palestinians and the Lebanese.

• The influx of Palestinians did not destabilize Syria, which was a more homogenous country. Palestinians received the benefits of Syrian citizenship (e.g. owning land) but were denied nationality, passports, and voting rights.

• Other countries like Libya and Algeria were growing their oil economies. Many Palestinians went there and helped build up the industries, government, and education systems, but they were not granted citizenship or permanent residency.

Overall, Arab states “felt great and continuing concern about the question of Palestine, both out of broad sympathy for the people and because of the humiliating defeat of 1948” (p. 87). Khalidi writes that Arab countries would talk about Palestine because of domestic pressure, but ultimately not do anything about it out of fear of Israel’s might and the disapproval of the great powers. The question of Palestine was henceforth dubbed the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Palestinian endeavors to establish governance structures encountered significant challenges. Despite efforts by the AHC to create the Government of All Palestine in Gaza, its legitimacy was not recognized by neighboring Arab states, particularly Jordan, who did not want Palestine to have independent representation. The shattered remnants of Palestinian civil society, including trade unions and other non-elite groupings, in the aftermath of the Nakba, left few avenues for effective political organization. Notably, the Palestinian Communist Party, with its predominantly Arab membership but Jewish leadership, stood as a rare exception, eventually evolving into the core of the Israeli Communist Party.

Amidst this turbulent backdrop, militant activities targeting Israel began to emerge, culminating in the formation of Fatah in 1959. In response to the escalating Palestinian struggle, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed in 1964, though it was largely controlled by Arab States. 

There eventually was a campaign of Palestinian-led sporadic but lethal attacks on Israel despite heavy-handed repression by Egypt. Israel’s retaliation to these attacks, however, was “massive and disproportionate, and saw Gaza bearing the brunt of these attacks (p. 91).

One significant escalation of violence was marked by the Suez War of October 1956, which was Israel’s large-scale military operations against Egypt and police posts in Gaza. To fight back, Egypt wanted to purchase weapons from the US and Britain but were not permitted to, leading them to buy them from Czechoslovakia and exacerbating international tensions. In this crisis, the Egyptian military was ordered to help the Palestinians they were previously repressing. Israel began a full-scale invasion of Egypt in October 1956, and Egypt was “decisively and rapidly defeated,” having lost the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip (p. 93). During this time, Israeli troops swept through the camps of Khan Yunis and Rafah in November of 1956, killing and executing more than 450 people. Israel said these people were killed as a result of clashes between Israelis and Palestinians, but an UNRWA report found that “civilians were killed after all resistance had ceased in the Gaza Strip” (p. 94). Israel eventually withdrew from the formerly Egyptian-controlled territories in early October 1957. 

In conclusion, the Nakba shocked and humiliated Palestinians in such a way that it gave way to a desire to resist the powers repressing them, leading to a series of lethal armed raids that triggered disproportionate Israeli attacks in retaliation.